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Cleavage in American
Attitudes toward Social Welfare
WILLIAM

M. EPSTEIN

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
School of Social Work

Opinion polls probing both the narrow and broad senses of social welfare
among Americans indicate hardly any substantialdifferences over crucial
social sentiments among a variety of groups with at least theoretically
divergent interests: rich and poor, men and women, blacks and whites,
a variety of ethnic groups, union and nonunion households. The items
mainly concern the provision of welfare to the poor through AFDC, now
TANF, and Food Stamps but also cover OASDHI. Consistentlyover more
than sixty five years of systematic opinion polling, there is an astonishing
consensus, so large in fact that it may undermine any effort to move the
American citizenry into a more congregationalseries of provisionsfor each
other.In fact, the consensus is antagonisticto the public welfare. Americans
by their very actions, opinions, and codified intentions have canceled the
notions of class and caste in subvertinga generous welfare state.
Key words: attitudes toward social welfare; cleavage; polarization;culture wars

The Englishman William Robson put his finger on the heart
of the problem: "Unless people generally reflect the policies and
assumptions of the welfare state in their attitudes and actions, it
is impossible to fulfill the objectives of the welfare state" (Robson
1976). He might have gone on to point out that it is impossible to
sustain any public policy in a democracy with deep divisionscleavages-among the population.
The issue of cleavages in American attitudes toward social
welfare has received surprisingly little attention except as expressed by aggregated data. Anatagonism toward welfare and
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welfare programs has been widely supported (Dimaggio, Evans
and Bryon 1996; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Page and Shapiro 1992;
Baggette, Shapiro and Jacobs 1995; Page, Shapiro, and Young
[1986]; Shiltz 1970; Erskine 1975; Public Agenda 1995). The few
studies suggesting popular support to expand the welfare state
(Cook and Barrett 1992; Demos 2002) or documenting a shift in
attitudes over the past decades (Teles 1998) have been seriously
flawed.
Income class would seem to be one of the most compelling
variables in any analysis of decision-making and social attitudes.
However, sixty five years of polled attitudes toward social welfare have rarely been disaggregated by income group; Page and
Shapiro (1996) is a rare exception but even their treatment is cursory. Attitudes toward welfare are customarily reported by ethnicity, gender, region, and others but undifferentiated by income.
Contemporary disputes over social issues generally-the
"culture wars"-and over the source of social sanction for public policy decisions (elites versus masses; class dominance versus pluralism) are sensitive to cleavages in the American polity
(Domhoff 1996, 1990, 1967; Domhoff and Dye 1987; Mills 1956;
Hunter 1953; Hunter 1991, 1994; Wolfe 1996; Gordon 1994;
Downey 2000; Gitlin 1995). Small actual cleavages in American
opinions among important political groups-a great consensus
over public policy-would reduce these disputes to media events
and public entertainments. Large political cleavages would begin
to point to the consistent influence of particular groups in determining social policy. So far, the evidence for a general consensus
rather than deep cleavages is considerable although again there
is hardly any analysis by income class although somewhat more
by race and gender (Dimaggio, Evans and Bryon 1996; Mouw
and Sobel 2001; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002; Brooks and
Cheng 2001; Miller and Hoffmann 1999; Hoffman and Miller
1998; Evans 1997; Williams 1997). Presumably the most intense
debate-abortion-is distinguished by a split between the prochoice left and the center but not with the anti-abortion right
which appears to very unpopular (Dimaggio, Evans and Bryon
1996). With great support for contemporary social policy or without general support for change or even deep cleavages in attitudes
toward current policy, there is little prospect for new policies in a
democracy.
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Method
The separate polls of the General Social Surveys (1972-1998)
(GSS), the National Elections Studies (1948-1998) (NES), the CBS/
New York Times Polls (since 1976) (CBS/NYT) and others were
analyzed to describe the cleavage-that is, welfare polarizationin American attitudes to the narrow and broader sense of social
welfare and to attempt to place any consensus that may exist
within the context of American policy. The narrow sense of welfare is defined as public attitudes toward AFDC, now TANF,
and the Food Stamp Program, to a number of specific issues and
policies closely allied with those program, mainly the federal role
in underwriting the programs and to a associated attitudes especially including those toward blacks. The broader sense of welfare
focuses on OASDHI (Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health
Insurance), what is commonly referred to as Social Security and
Medicare, as well as associated attitudes.
Cleavage is explored as the differences between rich and poor
whites and blacks, men and women, and to a smaller degree,
among ethnic groups and union and nonunion households. The
analytic problem is not to find statistically significant differences,
since only the tiniest difference will fail to be highly statistically
significant with such large samples. Rather, the central task of the
research is to interpret whether the differences among the study
groups are substantial for purposes of social policy and social
welfare. There is no quantitative test of substantiality but rather
a number of far more amorphous considerations discussed in
the Conclusions. The backup Appendix data tables are available
online at www.univ.edu/faculty3/epstein/polls.
The narrow sense of welfare is explored with three types of
questions that probe: first, attitudes toward welfare (AFDC, now
TANF) and Food Stamps -e.g., whether to increase or decrease
spending on them-and their effects, such as whether they decrease work incentives; second, attitudes toward the federal government's role in sustaining these program and toward closely
related questions of public responsibility for the poor and needy;
and third, attitudes toward blacks and government responsibility
to secure their welfare.
The broader sense of welfare focuses first on OASDHI but also
explores a variety of adjunctive attitudes that seem to underpin
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the citizens' sense of general welfare: finances, family, children,
education, being cultured, life satisfaction and happiness, the role
of government beyond its responsibility for the poor, the trade off
between social spending and taxes and so forth.
The Findings section presents highly summarized data. However, it is impossible to array all of the comparisons reported in
the paper; and therefore, following current practice, the reader is
invited to request specific additional information from the author.
In almost every comparison, cleavage among income groups
is virtually absent for the top four quintiles or so. The data are
therefore only presented at the ends of the income distributions,
purposely searching for the greatest instances of cleavage.
The statistical properties and characteristics of the pollssampling, question wording and order, representativeness and so
forth--can be traced back from their separate code books (Davis
and Smith 1996; Miller and Traugott 1989). Both the GSS and the
NES conduct face to face interviews, the latter biannually and the
former more frequently. The other polls are phone interviews.
Findings
The narrow sense of welfare
The attitude differences toward welfare, that is, cleavage,
between rich and poor men, women, blacks and whites, between
poor and wealthy union and nonunion households, and among
ethnicities are typically small, theoretically insubstantial, or both.
The cleavage between poor blacks and wealthy whites is occasionally substantial but this difference has been declining since the
1980s. It is notable that there is rarely any cleavage of note among
the top four income quintiles; for all intents and purposes they are
indistinguishable. Whatever cleavage exists is most pronounced
between the poorest and wealthiest. There were no substantial
cleavages among these groups in their attitudes toward welfare
increases, personal responsibility, or a range of other associated
attitudes. Except occasionally, all groups consistently preferred
personal responsibility, limiting welfare payments, the stringent
reform measures of 1996, and attitudes hostile toward welfare
recipients.
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Table 1
Percent responding "we're spending too much"*on welfare and
average differences between poorest and wealthiest groups by race. GSS
1973-1998
Income group
Quintile
Bottom
Top
Difference
Decile
Bottom
Top
Difference

All

White

Black

Difference white/black

35.1
58.3
23.2

41.1
59.1
18.0

16.8
37.2
20.4

24.3
21.9
-2.4

29.5
59.0
29.5

35.9
60.2
24.3

16.6
36.7
20.1

22.3
23.5
4.2

*Responses=too much, about right, too little
In the 21 polled years between 1973 and 1998, differences
between the poorest and wealthiest quintiles were only 23.2 percentage points in reporting to the GSS that "we're spending too
much money on welfare" (Table 1). In any polled year differences
infrequently exceeded thirty percentage points (Table 2). Yet the
income differential between the lowest quintile and the upper
quintile is enormous; the upper income threshold of the lower
quintile of respondents is barely above the poverty line for a family of three (Appendix Tables 1-6). The differences between the
lower decile of respondents, the best off of whom are often well
below the poverty line, only adds a few percentage points totaling
an average cleavage of 29.5 between them and the wealthiest
decile of respondents (Table 1). Differences rarely exceeded 35
percentage points (Tables 2-3, Appendix Tables 4-6). Differentials
between whites and blacks were also under thirty percentage
points. The only differentials that were larger than fifty percentage
points occurred between the poorest blacks and the wealthiest
whites and only occasionally (Appendix Tables 4-6). There was
no cleavage among ethnic groups (Western Europe, Mid or Central Europe, New World Hispanic, American Indian) and only
about 30 percentage points separated blacks from Europeans (GSS
tabulations).
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Table 2

Percent of all responden;tsreporting "we're spending too much money
on welfare."* Approximate lower quintile vs. approximate upper
quintile family income, poverty line, income thresholds of quintile
vs. approximate upper quintile family income, poverty line, income
thresholds of quintiles, cumulative percent. 1972-1998 General Social
Survey.

Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1996
1998

Those with lower
20% income brackets

Those with upper
20% income brackets

N

N

%

%

Percentage
difference

33.2
28.3
31.4
50.0
48.4
41.2
42.6
23.3
37.0
29.2
34.4
29.3
25.4
25.2
32.9
38.3
25.5
39.2
47.1
46.3
29.9

*Responses=too much, too little, about right.

In contrast, with five possible responses between independence and government responsibility for the poor, average cleavage was even less between the poor and the wealthy (17.2 percentage points) and blacks and whites (14.5 percentage points)
(Tables 4-6, Appendix Tables 7-12). The cleavage increased only

American Attitudes toward Social Welfare

183

Table 3
Percent of all respondents reporting "we're spending too much money
on welfare."* Approximate lower decile vs. approximate upper decile
family income, poverty line, income thresholds of deciles, cumulative
percent. 1972-1998 General Social Survey

Year

Those with lower
10% income brackets

Those with upper
10% income brackets

N

N

%

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1996
1998

%

Percentage
difference
34.1
32.6
29.5
24.3
41.7
42.7
31.6
36.8
26.8
22.7
30.2
23.3
38.6
42.6
22.3
7.4
26.5
19.6
34.3
21.6
21.8

*Responses=too much, too little, about right.

slightly in comparing deciles, 21.8 and 18.7 respectively. Whites in
particular had substantial preferences for personal responsibility
as opposed to government responsibility, one of the areas of
consistent but not large disagreement between whites and blacks
over the years but also an area of recent convergence (also see
Public Agenda 1995).
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Table 4
Percent strongly agreeing "that people should take care of themselves"
rather than the "government should improve the living standards of
all poor Americans"*and average differences between poorest and
wealthiest groups by race. GSS 1975-1998
Income group
Quintile
Bottom
Top
Difference
Decile
Bottom
Top
Difference

All

White

Black

Difference white/black

15.9
33.1
17.2

21.0
35.2
14.2

9.7
9.4
-0.3

10.4
25.8
14.5

14.9
36.7
21.8

16.6
36.8
20.2

10.1
11.6
1.5

5.5
25.2
18.7

*Responses=five responses from strongly agree with the former to strongly agree
with the latter

The consensus preference for personal responsibility and consistently against increasing welfare, is even stronger in light of the
fact that much larger percentages of respondents simply agreed
rather than strongly agreed that people should care for themselves while about one third of respondents each year stated that
welfare payments were adequate as they were. There were only
small preferences for government responsibility and increases in
welfare even among poor people. Indeed, on average thirty-five
percent of the poorest white Americans wanted to cut welfare
benefits. Again, the top four quintiles provide very similar responses to queries about both the welfare budget and government
responsibility, emphasizing the centrality of the natural economic
preferences of higher income groups. Continuing the suggestions
of Schiltz's (1970) earlier tabulations, the data document America's consistent hostility since the beginning of systematic polling
in the 1930s across income classes toward public assistance.
Welfare is perceived increasingly as a local administrative
responsibility with enormous majorities of wealthy men, women,
and whites preferring state standards and responsibility over
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Table 5

Percent of all respondents stating strong agreement that "people
should take care of themselves" rather than the "government should
improve the living standards of all poor Americans." Approximate
lower quintile vs. approximate upper quintile family income, poverty
line, income thresholds of quintiles, cumulative percnet. 1972-1998.
General Social Survey.
Those with lower
20% income reporting
people should take
care of themselves
Year

N

1975
1983
1984
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1996
1998

61
53
41
46
58
27
25
24
24
44
78
60
58

Those with upper
20% income reporting
people should take
care of themselves

%

N

%

Percentage
Prntae
point difference
between top and
bottom quintiles

17.6
16.3
14.4
15.8
15.5
14.4
12.6
13.4
11.8
19.6
20.4
17.3
17.6

133
114
103
107
99
70
84
55
71
81
161
129
149

30.9
39.7
36.8
31.8
27.5
33.0
32.6
24.8
27.0
32.5
35.2
38.2
39.7

13.2
23.4
22.4
16.0
12.0
18.6
20.0
11.4
15.2
12.9
14.8
10.9
12.1

federal responsibility for welfare programs (CBS/NY Times April
1995). In fact, these attitudes strongly endorsed the reforms of
1996 (witness the large consensus reported by Public Agenda
1995) and continue to sustain their reauthorization in 2004. Near
majorities of poor men women and whites felt the same way.
Blacks demurred, but surprisingly poor blacks less than wealthy
blacks. In the same poll, wealthy men, women, and whites overwhelmingly wished to limit "the amount of money available for
welfare benefits even if this means there might not be enough
money to cover all families who qualify." Approximately forty
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Table 6

Percentof all respondents statingstrong agreement that "people should
take care of themselves" rather than the "government should improve
the living standardsof all poor Americans."* Approximate lower decile
vs. approximate upper decile. 1975-1998. General Social Survey.
Approximate
bottom decile

Approximate
top decile

Percentage

Year

N

%

N

%

point difference

1975
1983
1984
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1996
1998

33
29
19
21
35
11
14
7
10
21
31
31
27

16.1
16.5
11.2
15.8
17.7
11.7
14.0
8.0
10.6
22.3
17.1
16.6
16.5

82
59
103
57
65
46
30
28
41
42
71
85
72

34.9
41.8
36.8
37.0
29.3
35.1
30.6
27.2
35.7
40.4
39.7
41.7
42.6

18.8
25.3
25.6
21.2
21.6
23.4
16.6
19.2
25.1
18.1
22.6
25.1
26.1

*Responses=strongly agree that government should improve living standards,
agree, agree with both, agree that people should take care of themselves, strongly
agree.

percent of poor men, women and whites agreed. However, cleavages between wealthy and poor were never even twenty percentage points. The same pattern repeats to support the Republicans
in Congress as they "completely rebuild the welfare system"
along these lines (CBS/NY Times April 1995).
There is a lineage to these types of responses. Only a majority of blacks, and only in 1984, agreed that "families are not
getting enough welfare" is a more serious problem than families
"getting more welfare benefits than they need" (CBS/NY Times
September 1984, January 1988). Only very small percentages of
men, women, and whites agreed. One decade later, all groups
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including blacks were much less sympathetic (CBS/NY Times
January 1994). Indeed, while over seventy percent of poor and
wealthy males, females, blacks, and whites endorsed government
"financial assistance for children raised in low income homes
where one parent is missing" (CBS/NY Times July 1977), almost
twenty years later, all of these groups except poor blacks cut
their support in half for a more leading question: "spending on
programs for poor children" (CBS/NY Times December 1994).
The hostility seems aimed toward recipients as much as
toward the programs themselves, a difficult distinction to make
since the recent social disapproval of racist expression may suppress certain responses. Welfare recipients are obviously considered to be able-bodied and therefore should be independent
since Americans consistently agree that "it is the responsibility
of the government to take care of people who can't take care
of themselves" (e.g., CBS/NY Times January and April 1995).
However, very large percentages of rich and poor men, women,
blacks, and whites, and often more than fifty percent, agree that
"most people who receive money from welfare could get along
without it" rather than "most of them really need this help" or
"half and half" (CBS/NY Times July 1977, March 1982, January
1994, December 1994). Cleavages were usually less than ten percentage points with even blacks infrequently demurring by much.
Moreover, there was hardly any cleavage at all by ethnic descent
with only small and intermittent differences, again usually less
than ten percentage points, between poor and wealthy Americans
who identified themselves as Italian, Slavic, German, Black, Irish,
Scandinavian, Latin, British, or "other, American" with (CBS/NY
Times September 1976); there was also very little cleavage among
the ethnicities themselves (CBS/NY Times September 1976three questions by ethnicity).
The tenets of unworthiness-tested by the perceived unwillingness to work-cut across almost all groups, rich and poor.
Only a majority of blacks and only in December 1994 believed
that "most recipients really want to work" (CBS/NY Times January 1994, December 1994, February 1995). Curiously, wealthier
respondents customarily endorsed this finding slightly more than
the poor perhaps tacitly confessing an ignorance of the unpleasantness of lower paid jobs-but again, hardly any cleavage. Large
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majorities of poor and wealthy men, women, and whites and a
near majority of poor blacks in January 1994 consistently report
that "there are jobs available for most welfare recipients who
really want to work" (although note that the New York Times
may have really wanted this response to endorse their preference
for work training or a work program) (CBS/NY Times January
1994, December 1994). But majorities of all these groups, reaching
eighty percent for wealthy females report that the jobs do not
"pay enough to support a family." Independence from welfare
is characteristically preferred over the reduction of poverty-the
presumed nobility of work no matter what its consequences.
Enormous majorities believe that "people are so dependent
on welfare that they will never get off" (CBS/NY Times January
1994, April 1995) and that unmarried mothers who are under
eighteen and "have no way of supporting their children" as
well as other welfare recipients should enter work programs and
"should stop receiving [welfare] benefits" after a period of time
(CBS/NY Times February 1995). Moreover, about twenty percent
of all these types of respondents believe that "giving welfare
to poor people" increases crime rather than decreases it or has
no effect (the dominant response) (CBS/NY Times July 1977); a
slightly smaller percentage of all groups believe that "most people
are on relief for dishonest reasons" (CBS/NY Times 1995).
Indeed, reported attitudes toward the programs may be proxy
for attitudes toward some of the recipients. That is, respondents
may make use of the opportunity offered by questions about welfare and welfare recipients to voice their attitudes toward blacks
and other minorities or perhaps the poor generally, conflating a
sense of moral deficiency with the relief programs themselves.
The NES, sometimes back to the 1960s, and CBS polled for
the federal government's responsibility to assist and compensate
blacks, for fairness in employment, and for associated attitudes.
First it is obvious that little cleavage exists among the various
groups and that even the black/white differentials, while consistent, are customarily small (the seemingly large differentials between wealthy blacks and other groups may be artifacts since the
group often contained very few respondents and sometimes none
at all). Second, recalling that five responses from strong agreement
to strong disagreement were offered to the NES questions and
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that agreement and disagreement customarily contained a larger
proportion of responses than the extremes, antagonism to compensation, a federal role, fair treatment for blacks in employment,
and others was considerable, perhaps denoting hostility toward
blacks themselves and perhaps carrying over to the narrow sense
of welfare.
Except for blacks, the nation appears opposed to job preference for blacks even "where there has been job discrimination...
in the past" (CBS/NY Times July 1977, April 1995), believing that
"blacks should not have special favors" (NES) (Appendix Tables
13,13a). Again, except for blacks, few strongly agree that "over the
past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve" while
many feel that "blacks must try harder" (recalling the confusion
created by "must" which may mean that whites believe they
should try harder while blacks believe they are forced by racism
to carry an extra load) (NES) (Appendix Tables 14, 14a). These
antagonisms are even that much greater in light of the socially
approved attitude of nondiscrimination and fairness. If indeed
the pressures of social comformity suppressed even a modest
amount of hostility, then the actual amount of racism and perhaps
also hostility to the poor generally-the contemporary notion of
an underclass of incorribles, deviants, and malingerers-grows
as a daunting impediment to the welfare state.
The broadersense of social welfare
Very large proportions of all study groups between 1984 and
1996 endorsed increases in spending on Social Security; still, there
is virtually no cleavage at all (Appendix Tables 15, 15a). As Page
and Shapiro (1992) point out, this has become such a standard of
America's reported attitudes that it is only infrequently queried.
While support for a national health insurance plan seems to have
eroded over the past thirty years there is again very little cleavage,
on the order of twenty percentage points between wealthy and
poor groups (and curiously high nonresponse rates in 1972 and
1984). Cleavage is slightly more but again under thirty percentage
points in preferences to "completely rebuild" the American health
care system (CBS/NY Times January 1994). At the same time,
there are only insubstantial differences, remarkably small considering the income differentials, between poor and wealthy groups
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in choosing between taxes and spending on "social programs"
(GSS 1993). The wording is far more benign than "welfare" but it
still did not elicit strong support even among very poor people.
Hardly any group places great trust in the "government in
Washington to do the right thing "just about always," even at the
height of the Reagan presidency (CBS/NY Times January 1986),
which is carried over as a preference for state and local government (CBS/NY Times January 1986). A majority or near majority
of all groups responded yes when asked if "there are any groups
in America today that are not given a fair chance to succeed
economically" (CBS/NY Times 1984); it was surprising that many
more did not agree with this near truism. About forty percent of
all groups except blacks whose percentages were much higher
reported that "government programs created in the 1960s...
made things better" (CBS/NY Times January7 1986) and majorities, sometimes very large for all groups except wealthy males,
agreed that "the federal government should spend money now
on a similar effort to try to improve the condition of poor people in this country"-note again the use of "poor" rather than
"people on welfare" (CBS/NY Times January7 1986). There was
a strong positive response in all groups except wealthy blacks to
the proposition "that it is as possible now as when [they] finished
school to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become
rich" (CBS/NY Times August 1988).
As elsewhere, there is hardly any cleavage at all between the
poor and the wealthy relative to a variety of social attitudes:
financial security, being cultured, having faith in God, having
children, being married, having nice things, being self-sufficient,
and having a fulfilling job (GSS 1993). The poor and the rich
equally reject nihilism ("life serves no purpose") (GSS 1998). The
paradox of satisfaction is even more astonishing; consistently
between 1972 and 1998, a cleavage of only about twenty five
percentage points separated people well under the poverty line
and the wealthy in reporting that they are "very happy.., with
the way things are these days" (GSS 1972-1998).
The Case of OrganizedLabor
Workers presumably form unions in response to the constraints of the labor market, the need to counter the natural
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Table 7
Percent response to "In general, how good are labor unions for the
country as a whole?" by union and nonunion households. General
Social Surveys 1988-91.
Union household
Respondent
in union

Spouse in
union

Both in
union

Nonunion
household

100%

10.8

4.9

0.9

83.4

How good are unions?
Excellent
Very Good
Fairly Good
Not very good
Not good at all
Can't choose
Total %

13.1
35.7
39.3
7.1
2.4
2.4
100.0

0.0
21.1
68.4
5.3
2.6
2.6
100.0

0.0
14.3
71.4
0.0
14.3
0.0
100.0

1.9
15.1
47.1
20.1
5.9
9.9
100.0

tendencies of society to neglect its less well off, and the power of
employers relative to individual employees. Moreover, in order
to organize, unions presumably develop a greater consciousness
of the right for social welfare among their members than would
be present among those not in labor unions. However, union
households hardly ever differ in their attitudes from non-union
households suggesting perhaps that there is no distinct social
philosophy underpinning the organization of American labor,
only a syndicalist ambition to compel higher wages and benefits.
Surprisingly, there are only modest differences between union
and nonunion households toward the importance of labor unions
themselves, even when their central value is probed (Table 7).
The absence of a distinct social philosophy grounded in the
grievances and broader social rights of working people and the
general hostility of Americans toward social welfare perhaps
explains the decline of organized labor over the past forty yearstheir absolute decline in numbers, their startling relative decline,
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and their shift from industrial organization to middle class occupations and the public sector. Today, labor organization is in
the process of realizing Kuttner's prophesy of shrinking to craft
union size (Kuttner 1985).
Anomalies and differences: blacks vs. whites, broader vs. narrower
welfare, ritual vs. operant values
Until recently blacks consistently voiced greater support than
whites for public welfare and the role of the federal government,
blaming those in need less, and wishing more to address those
needs. At the same time the data also corroborate earlier observations by Shapiro [1986] that the cleavages between blacks and
whites are narrowing as are differences among income groups,
including the poor and the rich. Indeed, Public Agenda's poll in
1995 reported virtually no difference at all between blacks and
whites in their attitudes toward welfare and, more surprising,
very few differences between them and welfare recipients who
are by definition very poor. Schiltz (1970) documents a similar
hostility toward public assistance between recipients of public
assistance and the general population during the Depression and
shortly afterwards.
Yet such as the differences are between blacks and whites,
there is no consensus among blacks that suggests the indignation
and rage of Malcolm X, Leroy Jones, James Baldwin, or Richard
Wright. Indeed, the absence of extreme cleavages and the more
recent apparent satisfaction of blacks with social policy may help
to explain the decline of black civil disturbances over the past few
decades. Voltaire would have been pleased, Marat horrified.
While there is a customary lack of cleavage and a general
hostility to the narrow sense of social welfare, there are reported
attitudes that would seem to sustain the provision of broader
social welfare and some ancillary programs to TANF in contradiction of current social welfare policy. In particular, Americans
consistently endorse higher Social Security benefits; many seem
to want national health insurance and enhanced job training
programs; there is even an enormous agreement among different
ethnic groups for the federal government "to see to it that every
person who wants to work has a job."
Yet, the direction of federal retirement legislation seems to
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reward the wealthy who save outside of Social Security and to neglect poorer Social Security recipients. Moreover, approximately
forty million Americans are without any health coverage and
it is very questionable whether Medicare benefits will improve
substantially, even for prescription drug coverage. There is virtually no public sector jobs program and very little job training.
The stated support for a broader sense of social welfare beyond
and separate from programs for the poor themselves may be
illusory. Indeed, much of the apparent support for social welfare
in general may be more a shallow hope for good fortune projected
upon the federal government but without any strong political will
to convert aspirations into enforceable claims. The polls fail to
distinguish between real preferences and ritualistic affirmations
of America's ceremonial civil religion. So long as American policy
making is open and uncoerced, the specific program conditions of
public policy, actual policy choices rather than surveyed attitudes,
may actually realize the true preferences of the public will.
Conclusions
The bifurcation of social welfare policy in the United States
between modest work-related entitlements and inadequate, discretionary assistance for those outside of the labor force has
been sustained by broad popular consent. Neither the bifurcation of policy nor the actual insufficiencies of America's social
welfare programs appear to be impositions of an elite that is any
more predatory than the general citizenship. Rather, the American social welfare state, sustained by the embedded preferences
of Americans for market-related social hierarchies and minimal
relief of want, institutionalizes the triumph of classical liberalism
over welfare state liberalism. Hunter and Gitlin worry with little
cause over the ability of America to govern itself; polarization
appears restricted to abortion and perhaps a few other "body"
issues that in fact have not created much turmoil and that remain
peripheral to social welfare. Not coincidentally, the cleavages,
such as they may be, relate more to procedural issues of legal
right (to abortion or equal protection) and far less to the substantive (financial) issues of equality and poverty. Indeed, the
powerful underlying consensus on social welfare both in the
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narrow sense as well as more broadly defined-TANF and Food
Stamps on the one hand and OASDHI on the other-may even
be strengthened by displacing social conflict to largely symbolic
and procedural issues that preserve more important social values.
Inflamed conflicts over abortion and perhaps even the broader
feminist agenda, occurring between groups at the political margins, are like the breast thumping among apes, the head butting
in goats, and the tail dancing of the stickleback herring that serve
vicariously to defuse tensions, select leaders without blood, and
reinforce the probity of existing social institutions. There are no
culture wars in America apart from the entertainments of the
media.
Judged by its social welfare policies, the welfare state in the
United States contains a very modest amount of Lowi's (1964)
redistributive function, emphasizing regulation with even a tendency toward "distributive" policies (that is, social welfare as
group patronage). The popular consent, even if misguided, curiously endorses Domhoff's assertion that "classes and class conflict, along with protest and social disruption, have to be taken
seriously to understand power in America" but only in the sense
that the absence of turmoil is a measure of deep satisfaction with
things as they are (Domhoff 1990 282); America's ruling elite
seems to enjoy pervasive permission.
Moreover the programs themselves do not seem to be triumphs of autonomous state benevolence, defying by their actual
benefits the rudimentary expectations of Skocpol's demands for
broad entitlements and full employment (Skocpol 1995, 2000).
Still, in the absence of frankly expressed group and class differences, it is methodologically impossible to discern whether the
public has been propagandized into agreement or the leadership
fairly represents prior, popular references. Contrary to Domhoff,
the American state at least judged by its social welfare provisions,
is hardly the product of an elite, let alone a predatory one; nor
could it possibly be judged a beneficence of leadership by noble,
brave, maternal, and informed heroines who act largely within
the permissions and constraints of an enlightened pluralism. The
reigning and deep consensus profoundly rejects greater sharing,
greater entitlements, greater generosity, and more opportunity
secured by public interventions. Before expanding the provisions
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of the social security act it may be necessary for Skocpol to first
consider that the embedded displeasure with the redistributive
role of government produces little support for a tutelary state of
increased welfare and patrician regard.
The robustness of insubstantial cleavages even at the extremes
of income and the huge common consensus across time, different
surveys, a variety of groups and many different sorts of questions
commands attention to a profound American social pact and one
that perhaps explains the failure to achieve Robson's hopes for
a generous welfare state. Americans may be very satisfied with
things as they are, antagonistic toward both the narrowly focused
public assistance programs and a greatly expanded government
role in securing the general welfare. This uncivil complacency
may well erect an insurmountable barrier to expanded entitlements or greater sharing of any sort.
Generosity and ideological diversity while perhaps goals of
a vibrant public discourse in an Enlightenment society are apparently not characteristic of the American social welfare ethos,
at least since the 1930s and perhaps for the past few centuries.
In consideration of the technical ambiguities of the polls, it may
even be the fact that America has forged a characteristic political
ethos from the vast ethnic and racial ores of its peoples. Thirty
percentage point differences among groups that are very differently situated, while seemingly large, are certainly not large
enough to constitute class distinctions or even characteristic group
attributes. The expectations of class theory and conflict theory
would seem to demand far greater cleavages, perhaps on the
order of sixty or seventy percentage points. Differences of this
magnitude have separated poor blacks from wealthy whites but
usually before 1985; they quite obviously carry along with them
distinctions of caste made graphic in the cultural abyss that in fact
often separates the two groups.
The American political consensus on social welfare has cemented a position quite a bit to the right of center, ideologically
centered on voluntary civic participation and good character"compassionate conservatism:" communitarianism rather than
communalism. Not only are Americans antagonistic to welfare
narrowly defined but the antagonism is consistent through almost
every political division of the nation. Most notably, the poor and
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the wealthy, blacks and whites, men and women, union and
nonunion households, and the variety of ethnic groups share
in the same hostile attitudes. The cleavages between the very
wealthiest and the very poorest groups of Americans are insufficient to germinate a sizable constituency for more redistributive
and generous social welfare policies. Americans cherish their
unbounded markets and self-defeating heroic individualism, apparently willing to impose few restrictions for purposes of minimizing economic insecurity or relieving want.
The attempt to retrieve the public's actual but latent generosity from the meanness of standing policy is built on an imagined
distinction between the notion of welfare and the welfare programs themselves as if to argue that Americans are for relief but
against the poorly run programs that administer their generosity.
However, this argument comes apart in light of the widely shared
popularity of a work test (that is, the willingness to take a job,
any job), the widespread support for mandatory work, and a
stolid refusal to acknowledge frank need. Of course, it is a near
newspeak tautology for people to support relief for those who
deserve it. However, the actual meaning of policy is conferred by
the conditions of deservingness.
American social welfare policy itself reflects this consensus
of old liberal and new conservative, the dominance of industrial
Republicanism and deep-faith traditionalists. The 1996 welfare
reforms, grounded in little more than the nation's meanness of
purse and spirit, continue to be extremely popular. Compassionate conservatism is laying the track of public policy Indeed,
the enormous amount of reported support for OASDHI is not a
hopeful sign of greater American faith in the welfare state. Instead
it may represent the nation's private attitudes authorizing the
government's parsimonious public programs. Fully forty percent
of OAI retirees, typically the poorest paid workers, rely for at
least 80% of their income on their Social Security checks which
in 1999 averaged only $804 for all beneficiaries (Social Security
Administration 1998; Ways and Means Committee 2000). On the
other side, OAI maximums (about $2,650 for a family in 1999)
are paid to the relatively wealthy whose government checks
represent only a fraction of their incomes. Obviously return on
investment, not need, generosity, compassion, or forgiveness, is
the abiding criterion of American fairness.
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Americans appear to be consistently and historically opposed
to social welfare policies for the indigent with little desire for
even a generous series of social insurances for workers. Neither
vertical nor horizontal redistributional policies are popular. The
anomalous attitude that government should secure the general
welfare is probably voiced as the vaporous hope that traditional
American institutions of the market rather than the demeaning
programs of public welfare will provide a fair distribution of
American plenty.
Classical theoretical assumptions that apparently different social and material conditions greatly affect the attitudes of different
economic groups, races, ethnicities, and genders may have been
inoperative in the United States for the past seven decades or so
and perhaps for even longer. American processes of socialization
may enjoy a remarkable triumph over any material or social
reality of caste, class, or gender. All would be well for the very
large consensus around social welfare policy but for its cruelty
to poor and marginal citizens as well as to lower paid workers
in general. More than two thirds of recipients of TANF are poor
children who are saddled with the miscreancy that the nation
ascribes to their parents. Poor children in foster care are given
a pauper's mite. The poor who are permanently disabled are
treated as if they willfully perpetuated their disabilities. Hardly
anything at all is provided for single adults who can not or do
not work while many homeless Americans endure parked cars
and uninvited pedestrians in their living rooms. And so on with
inadequate health and mental health services for poor people
perhaps explained by a puzzling tolerance among the working
poor, near poor, and the majority of all blue collar workers for their
decades of stagnant and inadequate wages and their isolation
from even the frankly inadequate services afforded the very poor.
Yet if many Americans are in fact oppressed, they are unaware
or blithely accepting of their oppression. Any strategy to mobilize
an opposition to current social welfare policies must confront the
near identical dispositions of Americans and their apparently
great satisfaction if not complacency with social welfare policy
both in its narrow and broader senses.
The insistence among a number of the semi-professions, notably social work, that they are liberating the oppressed-a quaint
conceit in light of the obliviousness of the oppressed themselves
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to their suffering-needs first to find a population that acknowledges its need before it applies a remedy. Nonetheless, the literature of the personal social services, including psychotherapy, has
been engaging in a delicious irony of success for years: the liberation of the afflicted from afflictions they have do not know they are
suffering. Not only is liberationism an emperor without clothes,
but also a parade without an emperor, an audience, or reporters to
record events-a total fabrication starting with imagination and
building back to history. O'Connor's (2001) poverty knowledge
and Epstein's (1997) social efficiency seem to correspond well
with the popular ethos.
The reported support for increasing social security, substantial endorsements of a universal federal health insurance of one
sort or another, and other preferences for an expanded welfare
state documented most recently by Demos (2002) might appear
to argue for the popularity of the welfare state. Yet the problems
with polls may invalidate the reported preferences for expansion
(Epstein forthcoming 2006). More to the point than opinions, there
has been very little political activism in support of expanded social insurance. President Clinton's abortive attempt at a national
health plan and the near constant inability to increase the generosity of OASDI since the 1970s suggest that the program as it exists
may be far more expressive of the American consensus than the
reported polls. Indeed, the social security system seems perched
on retrenchment not expansion and citizen lobbies seem simply
protective of the present program. Still, this line of reasoningminimizing some reported preferences while accepting othersmay seem capricious. Yet in light of the substantial methodological deficiencies of opinion polling and the drift of the nation to the
right without much political dissent (indeed, with considerable
acquiescence), it may be prudent to ground interpretation of
reported attitudes in the facts of live political choices and traditional historical discourse. Whatever the ambiguities assigning
the American consensus a point on the political continuum, the
numbing consistency of reported preferences seems inescapable:
there is very little cleavage in American social welfare attitudes.
Inflecting these general conclusions another note, there may
be an active hostility to generosity by perhaps one third of the
population that taken together with the oblivious middle has
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probably undercut any serious progressive policy in the United
States. Moreover, the constituency for reform-the modern American liberal and the New Democrat in the style of former president
Clinton-unfortunately favors procedural equity rather than substantive equality as epitomized by support for affirmative action
over compensation and job training over the provision of public
jobs. There is hardly any endorsement of major budgetary initiatives to realize true structural reform. Without deep investments there is also little likelihood of addressing America's social
problems.
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